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2. The Objection !
Nozick’s most famous statement of his objection appears in his early work, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). But it is in his mature work, The 
Examined Life (1989), that his clearest formulation of it can be found. In 
this latter work, he writes: !
Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of 
experiences) you might desire. When connected to this experience 
machine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or 
bringing about world peace or loving someone and being loved in 
return. You can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they 
feel “from the inside.” You can program your experiences for…the rest 
of your life. If your imagination is impoverished, you can use the 
library of suggestions extracted from biographies and enhanced by 
novelists and psychologists. You can live your fondest dreams “from 
the inside.” Would you choose to do this for the rest of your 
life?...Upon entering, you will not remember having done this; so no 
pleasures will get ruined by realizing they are machine-produced.  6!
If hedonism were true, Nozick suggests, then “plugging in would constitute 
the very best life, or tie for being the best, because all that matters about a 
life is how it feels from the inside” . Intuitively, however, this is not so—7
there are alternatives that would be better for one. Therefore, hedonism is 
false. 
We can state Nozick’s objection simply, as follows: !
1. Plugging in would not be best for one. 
2. Hedonism entails that plugging in would be best for one. 
Therefore, 
3. Hedonism is false. !
In a nutshell: Hedonism entails something false, so hedonism is false. 
How does Nozick argue for (1)? Some philosophers have suggested 
that he argues for it by appeal to a claim about what we would want or 
choose to do if we were given the option of plugging in, in the following sort 
of way: !
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We would not want or choose to plug in to the machine, and this 
makes it the case that plugging in would not be best for us.  8!
Some who attribute this argument to Nozick object that nothing follows 
from the fact that something is desired (or would be desired under certain 
conditions) concerning whether it is desirable (i.e., worthy of being desired).  9
Others point out that if Nozick’s objection to hedonism includes this 
argument for (1), then it begs the question against hedonism by 
presupposing that well-being is determined by something other than 
pleasure and pain—namely, desire satisfaction and frustration.  10
However, these worries miss the mark, because Nozick never intended 
to argue for (1) in this way. He explicitly disavows this argument in the 
following passage: !
Notice that I am not saying simply that since we desire connection to 
actuality the experience machine is defective because it does not give 
us whatever we desire…for that would make “getting whatever you 
desire” the primary standard. Rather, I am saying that the connection 
to actuality is important whether or not we desire it—that is why we 
desire it—and the experience machine is inadequate because it doesn’t 
give us that.  11!
Not only, then, is Nozick not appealing to a desire-based theory of well-
being in his objection to hedonism, he intends the machine to make trouble 
for desire-based theories as well (a point I will return to in Section 4). 
Why, then, does Nozick ask us to consider what we would want or 
choose to do at all? The most charitable answer is: merely as an intuition 
pump for (1). That is, he asks us to consider whether we would want to plug 
in as a way of getting us to have the intuition that plugging in would not be 
best for someone. Imagining oneself faced with the choice of whether to plug 
in, and seeing what one would want or choose to do in this situation, makes 
vivid the fact that it would not be in the best interests of a normal human 
being to plug in. 
What, then, is Nozick’s argument for (1)? It may be suggested that he 
argues for (1) by pointing out some of the things that a person would be 
missing out on by plugging in—for example, in Nozick’s words, the ability 
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“to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them” , to 12
“focus on external reality, with [one’s] beliefs, evaluations, and emotions” , 13
to explore “reality and [respond], altering it and creating new actuality 
ourselves” , and so on. 14
But this suggestion, too, seems to mistake Nozick’s intention. While 
Nozick does indeed say that it is for reasons such as these that plugging in 
would not be best for one, this is not part of some argument that he has for 
(1). Instead, he seems to think that reflection on the experience machine 
case yields two distinct revelations—on the one hand, that hedonism and 
desire-based theories are false, and on the other, that well-being includes 
something like an ability to connect with or interact with reality. 
Nozick, I believe, does not attempt to argue for (1). Instead, he takes 
it for granted that most of his readers will find (1) intuitive. This has proven 
a safe assumption. Even those sympathetic to hedonism have admitted to 
finding (1) intuitive.  The genius of Nozick’s argument lies simply in 15
pointing out that something interesting and contested (i.e., the falsity of 
hedonism) appears to follow from something that is found almost universally 
acceptable (i.e., (1)). 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that, while the objection I have 
attributed to Nozick here is the one that has loomed so large in recent 
literature on well-being, not everyone is convinced that it is Nozick’s own. 
The chief dissenter here is Feldman (2011), who considers roughly the 
interpretation of Nozick I have given and says of it: “Possibly an interesting 
argument; definitely not in the text.”  Feldman’s reasoning is as follows: 16!
Careful study of the passage will reveal that Nozick does not explicitly 
claim to be refuting any theory of welfare or of value in general. He 
never mentions welfare or wellbeing or value or intrinsic value in the 
passage. Instead, he speaks almost exclusively about certain 
psychological matters. Thus, for example, he says (p. 43, 44) that 
reflection on the Experience Machine teaches us something about 
“what matters to us” or what is “important to us”. In other places he 
suggests that it tells us something about what we desire (p. 43), or 
what we would choose. All of these remarks more strongly hint that 
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he was interested in a psychological claim about what we value rather 
than in an axiological claim about what is valuable.  17!
But Feldman is here basing his interpretation of Nozick’s objection solely on 
the text of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oddly, he admits that Nozick’s 
“remarks in later writings tend to suggest”  the interpretation I have given 18
and that he (Feldman) finds so implausible. He notes, for example, that in 
The Examined Life, !
[Nozick] explicitly says that the example of the Experience Machine is 
intended to shed light on a question about value. In this context 
[Nozick] mentions the idea that “plugging in constitutes the very best 
life”.  19!
Feldman also concedes that “it is possible that when Nozick says that 
something ‘matters to us’ he means not just that we care about it, but that 
it is in fact good for us.”  20
Finally, Feldman admits that the objection I have attributed to 
Nozick is “fairly interesting” , while all existing alternative interpretations 21
of Nozick are pretty clearly “bad arguments”. 
In light of these points, not to mention my earlier observation that we 
can interpret Nozick’s appeal to what we would want or choose to do if 
given the option of plugging in merely as an intuition pump for (1), it seems 
most charitable to ascribe to Nozick the objection as I have outlined here. !
3. Recent Criticisms of Nozick’s Objection !
In this section, I want to explain and briefly discuss the most important 
recent criticisms of Nozick’s objection. !
3.1. A REASONABLE FEAR OF CATASTROPHE !
A common criticism of Nozick’s objection has been that, while it is true that 
most of us would not want or choose to plug in to the machine, the most 
straightforward explanation of this fact is one that is entirely consistent with 
hedonism—namely, that we would fear, quite reasonably, that the machine 
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might malfunction, that the premises on which it is kept might be overrun 
by fundamentalist zealots, that the scientists running it might turn evil, etc. 
If any of these things were to happen, then plugging in would be very bad 
for us indeed, whatever theory of well-being were true (including 
hedonism).  22
As I claimed above, however, Nozick’s appeal to what we would want 
or choose to do if given the option of plugging in seems to function in his 
objection merely as an intuition pump for (1). It is a dispensable part of the 
objection. We can ignore the question of whether we would want or choose 
to plug in, and instead ask directly whether it seems best for someone—
either oneself, a loved one, or a complete stranger—to plug in (or to have 
plugged in) in a case where the machine, as a matter of fact, does not 
malfunction, the premises are not overrun by fundamentalist zealots, the 
scientists do not turn evil, etc. Most people who ask themselves this latter 
question find themselves answering ‘no’ to it.  23!
3.2 AN IRRATIONAL FEAR, REVULSION, OR BIAS !
A second criticism of Nozick’s objection is that our unwillingness to plug in 
might be due, not to a reasonable fear of catastrophe, but to an irrational 
fear, revulsion, or bias. Perhaps we’d refuse to plug in because we’d be too 
scared of having wires inserted into our skull (just as we might be scared of 
a spider we know to be venomless and so harmless), or because we’d ‘feel 
icky’ at the thought of being submerged in a vat of liquid, or because—as 
quite a few philosophers have suggested recently—we have a status quo bias, 
an irrational tendency to prefer the way things are now to new or different 
ways.  24
As evidence for this latter (‘status quo bias’) explanation, it has been 
suggested that we consider a variant on Nozick’s case in which we are told 
that we are already plugged in to an experience machine. Ask yourself: 
Would you want to unplug? Many people reportedly say ‘no’.  This is 25
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supposed to show that in Nozick’s original case, it might not be our picking 
up on the intrinsic value for us of contact with reality that explains our 
reluctance to plug in, but merely our having an irrational impulse to stick 
with what we already have or know. 
These criticisms, however, also mistake the function of Nozick’s appeal 
to what we would want or choose to do if offered the chance to plug in. 
Nozick could accept that an important part of the reason we would be 
unwilling to plug in is that we have an irrational fear, revulsion, or bias—
that we find the thought of plugging in too scary, icky, or alien. His gripe 
with hedonism stands: it does not seem best for someone to plug in to the 
machine. !
3.3. THE DIFFICULTY OF HAVING A FINE-GRAINED INTUITION !
A third criticism of Nozick’s objection is that it is very hard, perhaps even 
impossible, when imagining the case, to have an intuition strictly about well-
being (i.e., about whether it would be best for someone to plug in).  26
If someone were to plug in, then this would likely be very bad for this 
person’s friends and loved ones, for they would be deprived of her company. 
Consequently, it might be morally wrong for this person to plug in, or best 
simpliciter that she not do so—things that, in turn, might entail that she 
has most reason not to plug in (whether or not it would be best for her to 
plug in). Perhaps we are implicitly aware of these things when imagining the 
case, and our awareness of them makes it hard or even impossible for us to 
have an intuition that is strictly about well-being. While we may think that 
it is (1) we are finding intuitive, it might instead be something else—say, 
that a normal human adult would have most reason not to plug in. 
Nozick himself was aware of this worry. This is why he suggested that 
in imagining the case, it might help to imagine that others !
can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need 
to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will 
service the machines if everyone plugs in.).   27!
While the matter is hardly resolved, most commentators seem to share 
Nozick’s view that we can have an intuition strictly about well-being.  28!
3.4 DEBUNKING THE INTUITION !
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A fourth criticism of Nozick’s objection is that, while (1) is indeed intuitive, 
this intuition is itself best explained, not as a response to or reflection of 
reality, but in a way that makes clear that it is not truth-tracking. When we 
understand where this intuition comes from, we will see that it should 
simply be ignored. 
One possibility, for example, is that this intuition is the product of an 
irrational fear, revulsion, or bias. (Note the difference between this 
possibility and the earlier-mentioned possibility that our wanting or choosing 
not to plug in might be due to an irrational fear, revulsion, or bias.) Why 
do we feel that it would not be best for someone to plug in? Perhaps it is 
because we find the prospect of plugging in scary, repulsive, or alien, and 
our emotional response here is clouding or contaminating our intuition 
about well-being. 
Another possibility is that our well-being intuition is being 
contaminated, not by an irrational fear, revulsion, or bias, but by our 
intuitions or judgments concerning other matters, such as the intuition or 
judgment that it would be morally wrong for one to plug in, that it would 
not be best simpliciter that one plug in, that one would have most reason 
not to plug in, that a life plugged in to the machine would be meaningless, 
aesthetically poor, low in achievement value, etc.  29
A further possibility has been suggested by Matthew Silverstein.  30
According to Silverstein, “[o]ur [well-being] intuitions tend to reflect our 
desires and preferences”, and we have been conditioned to have a strong 
“desire to remain connected to the real world, to track reality” . Why have 31
we been conditioned to have this desire? Roughly, it is because having this 
desire tends to lead one to happiness, and desires that tend to lead one to 
happiness are thereby strengthened. 
At the same time, desires that tend to lead one away from happiness 
are thereby weakened, and the desire for happiness itself is among these. 
Over time, then, our desire for happiness itself gets weaker, and along with 
it (since our intuitions reflect our desires) our pro-hedonism intuitions. 
Roger Crisp suggests a further explanation of the intuition that (1) is 
true. He says that wanting or caring about authenticity in relationships 
would likely have boosted the reproductive fitness of early human beings. He 
writes: !
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Valuing honesty, transparency, genuineness, and so on, has a clear 
pay-off: it fends off deception, and thereby assists understanding of 
the world, which itself issues in a clear evolutionary advantage.  32!
Moreover, feeling or judging that accomplishment matters in itself would 
likely have made one a better hunter during the Stone Age, and so resulted 
in one’s being “rewarded by [one’s] fellows, partly with a larger share of the 
available goods, but also with esteem and status within the group”.   33
Perhaps one reason we find (1) intuitive is that we are descended from 
those early humans who survived and reproduced so effectively, in part, by 
happening to have these sort of non-hedonistic dispositions and beliefs. 
These criticisms of Nozick’s objection merit serious consideration. In 
the remainder of this section, I want to raise three important challenges for 
them. First, it would be helpful if these authors were to explain precisely 
what the process is by which our well-being intuitions are affected by the 
desires, values, dispositions, or beliefs in question. Suppose Silverstein is 
right that we are likely to arrive at a powerful desire for contact with reality 
via the processes he describes. How does this desire in turn lead to our 
having a pre-theoretical feeling that contact with reality is intrinsically 
good, not only for oneself, but for people more generally? Or suppose Crisp 
is right that valuing authenticity, or wanting to really achieve things (as 
opposed to merely enjoying the fruit of one’s achievements), tended to boost 
the fitness of early humans. How does this valuing or desiring lead one in 
turn to feel (again, at a pre-theoretical level) that authenticity and 
accomplishment are good for those who possess them? What is the process? 
Second, it would be helpful if these authors were to explain what 
intuitions are not contaminated in the ways they describe. Presumably, we 
need to rely on some intuitions about well-being in our theorising about 
well-being. Which ones? If Silverstein is right that our well-being intuitions 
tend to come from our desires or preferences, are there any such intuitions 
that do not? If so, which ones? Alternatively, are there any basic desires 
that are themselves responses to or reflections of reality? Silverstein seems to 
think that the desire for pleasure or happiness may be one such desire, but 
his argument for this claim is underdeveloped—it would be nice to hear 
more on this.  Likewise, if Crisp is right that we can ignore well-being 34
intuitions that we have only because it was fitness-enhancing for our 
ancestors to have certain dispositions or beliefs, are there any intuitions that 
do not fall into this category? Which ones? 
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Third, there seem be some people who find (1) intuitive but who do 
not have any of the desires, values, beliefs, and dispositions these authors 
point to. I, for example, find (1) highly intuitive, but doubt very much 
whether I intrinsically want contact with reality, or value authenticity and 
accomplishment in the ways Crisp describes. How, then, did I, and others 
like me, come to find (1) intuitive? !
3.5 DISPUTING (2) !
While most critics of Nozick’s argument have focused on the status of the 
intuition that (1) is true, a different route is available: dispute (2). 
Hedonism might not entail that plugging in would be best for someone. 
Hedonism might be consistent with its not being best for one to plug in. 
One hedonist, Feldman, has suggested a version of hedonism that 
would deliver this result. On Feldman’s truth-adjusted hedonism, the amount 
that a given pleasure adds to its subject’s well-being depends on whether it 
is taken in something true.  Pleasures taken in true things add more to 35
well-being than otherwise identical pleasures taken in false things. Most 
pleasures experienced in Nozick’s machine are taken in false things—one 
thinks one is succeeding in one’s career, living with the most amazing 
partner, traveling the world, etc., when none of this is really happening. 
Therefore, according to truth-adjusted hedonism, these pleasures might add 
less to well-being than similar pleasures experienced in the real world. 
A second possibility is that (2) is false because one could not survive 
plugging in. Plugging in, after all, would not give one any pleasures if it 
resulted in one’s death. Nozick himself says that plugging in constitutes “a 
kind of suicide”, and of somebody who is plugged in to the machine that 
“there is no way he is” .  36
Why might plugging in kill one? Perhaps it is because, if one agrees to 
plug in, the machine would have to erase one’s memory of choosing to plug 
in, and this form of mental tampering might interrupt one’s psychological 
continuity in such a way that one’s consciousness would come to an end and 
be replaced with a numerically distinct one. 
But this suggestion, quite apart from its radical claim that the form of 
mental tampering in question would literally kill one, seems unable to 
explain why being plugged in by somebody else, without one’s knowledge 
(say, during one’s sleep) would still seem not best for one. If I am plugged 
in without my knowledge, there is no need for the machine to tamper with 
any of my memories. 
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A third possibility is that, while plugging in might not kill one, 
certain extremely valuable pleasures are unavailable in a machine like 
Nozick’s. For example, the pleasures of autonomy or free action may require 
the actual exercise of free will, something that is impossible in the machine 
(perhaps the machine can give one at best the impression of acting freely—a 
pale imitation of the real thing). 
However, presumably, the machine could be set up in such a way that 
it works, not by merely playing one a video tape of a life, as it were—
including the false appearance not only of having various options, but also 
of choosing freely among them—but by improving one’s apparent options 
(i.e., one’s options as they appear to one). If the machine were set up in this 
latter way, it would still be required that one choose between various 
options. So, one would still be capable of exercising a kind of free will, and 
so (even if the pleasures of free action require the actual exercise of free will) 
have access to the associated pleasures. 
Another suggestion is that the machine could not give one the full 
range of the pleasures of love and friendship. People often say that an 
important reason they would not plug in to the machine is that it would 
involve permanent separation from their friends and loved ones. Nozick 
himself writes: !
…we want a connection to actuality that we also share with other 
people. One of the distressing things about the experience machine, as 
described, is that you are alone in your particular illusion. (Is it more 
distressing that the others do not share your “world” or that you are 
cut off from the one they do share?)  37!
Perhaps the reason permanent separation from one’s friends and loved ones 
would be so bad for one is that it would necessarily have experiential 
consequences for one. The pleasures of love and friendship may require a 
certain subtlety in the language, facial expressions, bodily gestures, and 
actions of those around one that is beyond the capability of AIs (or at least 
AIs falling short of real conscious selves—the sort that would populate 
Nozick’s machine).  38
A general problem for this third account of why hedonism is 
consistent with (1) is that whatever pleasures one cannot get in the machine 
(whether of free action, love and friendship, etc.), these would have to be so 
very valuable for one that their absence could not possibly be compensated 
for by the very many pleasures that one surely could get in the machine. 
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4. The Desire-Based Theorist’s Explanation !
Many who claim that Nozick’s machine refutes hedonism accept some 
desire-based theory of well-being, on which lives can be good or bad for 
their subjects owing just to their ability to get (and fail to get) whatever it 
is they want. According to these philosophers, while hedonism cannot 
account for why plugging in would not be best for one, desire-based theories 
can. This is because most of us want contact with reality—or, at least, real 
accomplishment, real friendship, etc.—and plugging in would frustrate these 
desires. 
As I noted above, Nozick himself explicitly considered and rejected 
this account of why plugging in would not be best for one. According to 
him, the reason we would want not to plug in is that we would realise (even 
if only implicitly) that plugging in would not be best for us. The reason 
plugging in would not be best for us is not that it would deprive us of things 
we want, but that it would deprive us of things we should want even if we 
do not. 
Nozick’s own view aside, it is worth questioning the adequacy of the 
desire-based theorist’s explanation. One reason for thinking it inadequate is 
that seemingly not everyone has an intrinsic desire for contact with reality 
(or for things such as real accomplishment, real friendship, etc.), yet 
intuitively even those lacking such desires would be missing out on 
something by plugging in. When we encounter those rare individuals who 
say they would not mind plugging in, or would even welcome the 
opportunity to do so, we tend not to feel “Oh well, plugging in would be 
best for them.” Instead, we tend to feel that these people are making some 
kind of mistake—and not simply because they do not properly understand 
their own preferences (actual or idealised).  39
Given Nozick’s view and this serious worry, it may be more accurate 
for philosophers to start thinking of Nozick’s experience machine case as an 
objection, not to hedonism in particular, but to hedonism and desire-based 
theories together. !
5. Conclusion !
In this article, I have had three main goals: First, to reconstruct Nozick’s 
objection. Second, to explain and briefly discuss the most important recent 
criticisms that have been made of it. Third, to question the conventional 
wisdom that the experience machine case, while it neatly disposes of 
hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being. 
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